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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 2356

E.O. 11652: GDS-12/31/82
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
SUBJECT: NPG DRAFT PERM REP REPORTS

BEGIN SUMMARY: SYG LUNS HAS ISSUED TWO DRAFT PERM REP REPORTS PREPARED BY THE STAFF GROUP WHICH NPG PERM REPS WILL ADDRESS AT THEIR 16 MAY MEETING: (A) NPG/WP(74)4 - MILITARY COMMITTEE FUNCTION IN THE NUCLEAR CONSULTATION PROCESS (POUCHED TO STATE AND DEFENSE); AND (B) NPG/WP(74)5 - STUDY ON WARSAW PACT POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (PROVIDED IN PARAS. 1 AND 2 BELOW). AT THE 16 MAY MEETING, SYG LUNS WILL INVITE COMMENTS AND REQUEST APPROVAL BY PERM REPS TO CIRCULATE THESE REPORTS AS MINISTERIAL AGENDA DOCUMENTS FOR THE BERGEN NPG MEETING. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENTS AND/OR APPROVAL OF THE TWO PERM REP REPORTS PRIOR TO 13 MAY, AT WHICH TIME STAFF GROUP WILL DISCUSS NATION COMMENTS IN PREPARATION FOR PERM REPS MEETING. END SUMMARY.

1. BEGIN TEXT - DRAFT PERM REPS REPORT:
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STUDY ON WARSAW PACT POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

DRAFT REPORT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES

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DURING THEIR CONSIDRATION OF THE ACLANT FOLLOW-ON USE STUDY(1) AT THEIR MEETING IN ANKARA IN MAY, 1973, THE MINISTERS NOTED THAT POLITICAL AUTHORITIES OF THE ALLIANCE, IN CONSULTING ON A SELECTIVE RELEASE REQUEST, WOULD HAVE TO GIVE VERY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE WARSAW PACT (WP) RESPONSE THAT SUCH USE MIGHT PROVIDE AND TO THE RISK OF ESCALATING THE CONFLICT THAT SUCH USE ENTRAILS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY ALSO NOTED THE SUGGESTION(2) IN THE ACLANT STUDY THAT SOME INSIGHT ON THIS QUESTION MIGHT BE GAINED IN PEACETIME BY ASSESSING THE ACTUAL CAPABILITIES THAT THE WP POSSESSES AND BY SEEKING AS CLEAR A KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING AS POSSIBLE OF CURRENT WP POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE WHICH IS LIKELY TO GOVERN WP TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE MINISTERS THEREFORE INVITED(3) THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO ARRANGE FOR A STUDY ON THIS SUBJECT TO BE PREPARED FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION AT A FUTURE MEETING.

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(1) NPG/STUDY/19, 1ST DECEMBER, 1972
(2) NPG/STUDY/19, VOLUME I, PARAGRAPHS 21-25
(3) NPG/D(73)7, 21ST MAY, 1973, PARAGRAPH 9

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2. THE STUDY (1) WAS DEVELOPED BY AN AD HOC STUDY TEAM COMPOSED OF PARTICIPANTS FROM CANADA, DENMARK, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE NETHERLANDS, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE NETHERLANDS. THE STUDY TEAM WAS ASSISTED BY MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF, INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF AND SHAPE. PARTICIPATION BY NATIONAL OR NATO REPRESENTATIVES DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THE WP STUDY NECESSARILY REFLECTS THE VIEWS OF THE COUNTRIES OR STAFFS CONCERNED.

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(1) NPG/STUDY/45, 8TH MARCH, 1974. HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE WP STUDY.

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3. SINCE THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE STUDY EFFORT WAS TO EXPAND THE BASIS FOR NATO'S POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING IN ACTUAL CONFLICT SITUATIONS, THE APPROACH TAKEN IN THE WP STUDY IS NECESSARILY DIFFERENT, IN TERMS OF OBJECTIVE, POINT OF DEPARTURE AND RULES OF ANALYSIS, FROM OTHER APPROACHES USED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THEREFORE, THE WP STUDY GOES BEYOND THE ASSESSMENTS OF WP STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES REFLECTED IN THE NATO AGREED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BASE. WE BELIEVE THE WP STUDY IS AN IMPORTANT AND USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TOWARD THE OBJECTIVE OF REACHING A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF WP POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN OUR OPINION, IT SHOULD BE GIVEN A LARGER DISTRIBUTION WITHIN NATO. WE SUGGEST THAT THIS BE ACCOMPLISHED BY SUBMITTING IT TO THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE(DPC). AT ANNEX IS A DRAFT NPG REPORT TO THE DPC,

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CONTAINING SOME COMMENTS ON THE WP STUDY, WHICH IS INTENDED TO BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

4. IN ADDITION TO THE COMMENTS ON THE VALUE OF THE WP STUDY THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE DRAFT REPORT AT ANNEX, WE BELIEVE THE STUDY EFFORT WILL BE ESPECIALLY RELEVANT WITHIN THE NPG ITSELF IN SUCH PROJECTS AS THE FOLLOW-ON USE WORK PROGRAMME, THE TECHNOLOGY STUDY, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ADM GUIDLINES AND THE QUESTION OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS.

5. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE MINISTERS:

(A) TAKE NOTE OF THE WP STUDY(1);

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(1) NPG/STUDY/45

(B) DISCUSS THE ISSUES RAISED IN THE WP STUDY, AND IN THE DRAFT NPG REPORT TO THE DPC AT ANNEX;

(C) APPROVE THE DRAFT REPORT;

(D) IN VIEW OF ITS POTENTIAL RELEVANCE TO POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING, FORWARD THE REPORT TO THE NUCLEAR DEFENCE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE FOR ENDORSEMENT AND FURTHER TRANSMITTAL TO THE DEFENCE PLANNING COMMITTEE;

(E) AGREE THAT THE WP STUDY IS A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD THE OBJECTIVE OF REACHING A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF WP POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS;

(F) RECOGNISE THAT THE WP STUDY CONTRIBUTES TO THE UNDER-STANDING OF DETERRENCE; AND

(G) AGREE THAT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE WP STUDY DO NOT CALL IN QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF CURRENT NATO STRATEGY AND OTHER BASIC POLICY GUIDANCE.

ANNEX: DRAFT NPG REPORT TO THE DPC.

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2. BEGIN TEXT - ANNEX, DRAFT NPG REPORT FOR THE DPC:

STUDY ON WARSAW PACT POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

DRAFT REPORT BY THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP

I. PURPOSE

THIS REPORT FORWARDS A STUDY ON WARSAW PACT POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCITRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS(1), COMMENTS ON SOME OF THE POINTS RAISED IN THE STUDY, AND MAKES SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR DPC CONSIDERATION.

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(1) ATTACHED AT ANNEX. HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS WP STUDY.
(NOT INCLUDED WITH THIS DRAFT BUT WILL BE ATTACHED TO THE FINAL REPORT TO THE DPC.)

II. BACKGROUND
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2. DURING THE COURSE OF ITS DELIBERATIONS AT THE NPG MINISTERIAL MEETING AT ANKARA IN MAY 1973, THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO SEEK A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF WARSAW PACT POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A STUDY DEVELOPED UNDER NPG AUSPICES TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARD MEETING THIS NEED IS ATTACHED. OUR COMMENTS IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS SHOULD BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE WP STUDY ITSELF.

III. COMMENTS

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GENERAL EVALUATION

3. IN DEVELOPING ITS ANALYSIS, THE WP STUDY DREW(1) HEAVILY ON THE ASSESSMENT OF WP MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE SUMMARY OF THE STRATEGIC MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING SOVIET DECISION-MAKING WITH REGARD TO USE OF MILITARY POWER CONTAINED IN THE 1973 AGREED NATO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BASE(2). NEVERTHELESS, IN SEEKING TO REACH A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF WP POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY, THE WP STUDY ATTEMPTED TO GO BEYOND THE AGREED INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT TO CONSIDER THE POLITICAL ATTITUDES, THE MOTIVATIONS AND THE POSSIBLE PERCEPTIONS OF NATO INTENT WHICH MIGHT INFLUENCE SOVIET AND WP CONDUCT AND ACTIONS IN AN ACTUAL CRISIS, AND IN PARTICULAR THE POSSIBLE IMPACT THESE UNQUANTIFIABLE FACTORS MIGHT HAVE ON WP TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS(3). WHILE FULLY RECOGNISING THE NEED AND VALUE OF THE NATO AGREED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BASE, WE AGREE WITH THE WP STUDY THAT AN EXAMINATION OF THESE UNQUANTIFI-ABLE FACTORS IS DESIRABLE, SINCE IT EXPANDS THE BASIS FOR NATO DECISION-MAKING.

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(1) WP STUDY, VOLUME I, PARAGRAPH 2; VOLUME II, PART II
(2) "THE WARSAW PACT STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES," MC 161/73, 17TH MAY, 1973, PART I, SECTION 4; PART II. A DRAFT OF THE 1974 EDITION OF MC 161, WHICH BECAME AVAILABLE AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE WP STUDY, HAS BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE PREPARATION OF THIS REPORT.
(3) WP STUDY, VOLUME I, PARAGRAPHS 1, 4; VOLUME II, PARAGRAPHS 5, 35-44

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4. WE NOTE THE WP STUDY CONCLUSION THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO BE DOGMATIC ABOUT THE COURSE OF ACTION THE WP MIGHT TAKE IN AN ACTUAL CONFLICT, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO TACTICAL USEOF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND WE AGREE THAT NATO DECISIONS IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES WITH THE WP SHOULD NOT BE BASED SOLELY ON A SINGLE ASSUMPTIONOF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WP MIGHT RESPOND TO NATO USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS(1). THE QUESTION OF WP INTENTIONS AND LIKELY ACTIONS IS CENTRAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO DEFENCE POLICY AND TO THE ROLE OF ALLIED NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITHIN THAT POLICY, AND THERFORE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT NATO DECISION-MAKERS SHOULD BE AWARE NOT ONLY OF WP MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND WP MILITARY DOCTRINE CONCERNING POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT ALSO OF OTHER FACTORS THAT MAY INFLUENCE THE WP IN WAR.

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(1) WP STUDY, VOLUME I, PARGRAPH 18; VOLUME II, PARAGRAPHS 103-106

WP TACTICAL NUCLEAR OPTIONS

5. BOTH THE 1973 AND 1974 NATO AGREED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

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ASSESSMENTS ACKNOWLEDGE SOVIET AWARENESS OF THE DANGERS OF
UNCONTROLLED ESCALATION IN ANY NATO-WP CONFLICT, AND THE
PROBABILITY THAT THE WP WOULD SEEK VIGOROUSLY TO LIMIT THE
CONFLICT AND TO END IT THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS. THE 1973
ESTIMATE ALSO INDICATED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT THE WP
COULD BE EXPECTED TO RESORT TO PRE-EMPTIVE TACTICAL USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OR TO WIDE-SCALE RETAALIATION IN THE EVENT
OF NATO TACTICAL USE, SINCE THE WP DOES NOT SUBSCRIBE TO A
FORMAL STRATEGY OF GRADUATED NUCLEAR RESPONSE. WE NOTE, IN
THIS CONTEXT, THAT THE 1974 VERSION NOW STATES THAT SOVIET
MILITARY DOCTRINE APPARENTLY DOES NOT SUBSCRIBE TO A
STRATEGY OF GRADUATED NUCLEARRESPONSE.IF NATO WERE TO
MAKE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EVEN IN A TACTICAL SITUATION,
THE RISK OF AN ABRUPT ESCALATION IN SCALE, NATURE OR
TARGET, AREA OR ANY COMBINATION OF THESE WOULD BE GREAT,
THOUGH IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD AT LEAST
INITIALLY LIMIT THEIR RESPONSE TO THE THEATER CONCERNED(1).
THESE SPECIFIC ESTIMATES NOTWITHSTANDING, EVIDENCE

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(1) MC161/73, PART I, SECTION 4, PARAGRAPH 16; MC 161/74
(DRAFT), PART I, SECTION 1, PARGRAPH 16.

IN THE INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT INDICATES, AS THE WP STUDY NOTES(1),
THAT WP MILITARY FORCES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO EXERCISE A WIDE RANGE
OF OPTIONS FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT HAVE
THE SAME RANGE OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS AND YIELDS AVAILABLE TO NATO.
THIS CAPABILITY APPEARS
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6. FULLY RECOGNIZING THE EMPHASIS THAT THE AUTHORITATIVE
INTELLIGENCE VIEW PLACED ON THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS
COULD BE EXPECTED TO RETALIATE ON A WIDE SCALE IF NATO WERE
TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR TACTICAL PURPOSES, BUT ALSO NOTING
THE SOVIET AWARENESS OF THE DANGERS OF UNCONTROLLED
ESCLATION, THE WP STUDY IDENTIFIED AND DISCUSSED A NUMBER
OF FACTORS THAT MIGHT INDUCE THE WP IN AN ACTUAL CONFLICT TO
ADOPT A CAUTIOUS AND FLEXIBLE COURSE OF ACTION INT THEIR
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(1) WP STUDY, VOLUME I, PARAGRAPH 5; VOLUME II, PARAGRAPSH 63, 64, 92
(2) WP STUDY, VOLUME II, PARAGRAPHS 15-33
(3) WP STUDY, VOLUME II, PARAGRAPHS 21, 36, 67

APPROACH TO THE TACTICAL USE
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1). IN ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OF
SUCH A CAUTIOUS APPROACH BY THE WP, THE WP STUDY CONCLUDES THAT WP
FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS CONSIDERED VERY UNLIKELY, INDEED
CONCEIVABLE ONLY IN A SITUATION IN WHICH THEIR CONVENTIONAL ATTACK
SEEMED IN DANGER OF BEING UNABLE TO ACHIEVE ITS VITAL OBJECTIVES AND
-PERHAPS EVEN MORE UNLIKELY-THE SOVIET LEADERS WISHED TO BE
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FIRST WITH A DEMONSTRATION OF POLITICAL RESOLVE(2). FURTHERMORE,
THE WP STUDY OBSERVES THAT, ON THE ASSUMPTION OF A CAUTIOUS WP
APPROACH, IT IS NOT UNREASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THAT FOLLOWING THE
DEMONSTRATION OF NATO'S WILL ANDRESOLVE (INCLUDING IF NECESSARY
RESORT TO SELECTIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS) THE SOVIETS
WOULD DECIDE TO HALT THEIR AGGRESSION. THE WP STUDY ACKNOWLEDGES
THAT THIS IS ONLY ONE POSSIBLEOUTCOME OF SUCH AN ATTITUDE OF
CAUTION, BUT THAT ALTERNATIVELY THE WP MIGHT OPT FOR A NUCLEAR
RESPONSE WHICH STILL MIGHT BE VERY RESTRAINED OR WHICH, IF NATO'S
USE HAD CAUSED SIGNIFICANT INTERFERENCE WITH WP MILITARY PLANS,
WOULD NOT UNNECESSARILY EXCEED THE LOWEST LEVEL CAPABLE OF
RESTORING THE MILITARY SITUATION(3). IT FOLLOWS IN OUR VIEW THAT
THE EXISTENCE OF A WP CAPABILITY TO EXERCISE A WIDE RANGE OF OPTIONS
AND OF FACTORS SUGGESTING THAT WP NATIONAL LEADERSHIP MAY OPT FOR A
CAUTIOUS AND FLEXIBLE COURSE OF ACTION HAS IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS

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(1) WP STUDY, VOLUME I, PARAGRAPH 6; VOLUME II, PARAGRAPHS 93-99
(2) WP STUDY, VOLUME I, PARAGRAPH 7; VOLUME II, PARAGRAPHS 72-76
(3) WP STUDY, VOLUME I, PARAGRAPH 9; VOLUME II, PARAGRAPHS 77-85

FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO STRATEGY; FOR, IF THE WP ELECTED TO
FOLLOW
SUCH A COURSE OF ACTION, THIS WOULD PROVIDE THE MOST STAISFACTORY
CONDITIONS FOR THE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATO'S STRATEGY
OF FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSSE.

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7. THE WP STUDY POINTS OUT THAT THERE ARE PROBABLY TWO
DISTINCT (AND SOMETIMES CONFLICTING) INFLUENCES THAT WILL HAVE A
CRITICAL IMPACT ON WP POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND ON WP DECISIONS
DURING AN ACTUAL CONFLICT: THE AGGRESSIVE STANCE COMPATIBLE WITH
COMMUNIST REVOLUTIONARY AIMS, AND THE DEFENSIVE ATTITUDE AGAINST
A PERCEIVED WESTERN THREAT. WITH RESPECT TO THE LATTER, THE WP
STUDY NOTES THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT REGARD NATO'S DETERRENT STRATEGY
AS AN INTIMIDATING THREAT TO THEIR POLITICO-MILITARY SYSTEM, JUST
AS THE NATO VIEW OF THE WP CONCENTRATES ON THE THREAT IT IMPLIES FOR
WESTERN SECURITY (1). THIS, IN OUR VIEW, HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED FOR
NATO TO ENSURE THAT ITS OWN PLICY AND ACTIONS AVOID POSSIBILITIES
OF MISINTERPRETATION.

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IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO'S DETERRENT POSTURE

8. IN THE LIGHT OF THE POSSIBILITIES FOR MISINTERPRETATION
MENTIONED ABOVE, NATO MUST CONTINUE TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO ENSURE
THAT ITS DETERRENT POSTURE, WHILST REMAINING FULLY CREDIBLE,
DOES NOT PROVOKE THE AGGESSION IT IS INTENDED TO DETER.
TO REDUCE THE CHANCES OF WP MISINTERPRETATION
OF NATO INTENTIONS, NATO SHOULD GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE IMAGE
ITS DETERRENT POSTURE PORTRAYS TO THE WP, THROUGH SUCH ELEMENTS AS
THE STRATEGY, POLICY AND GUIDANCE MADE KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC OR TO THE
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(1) WP STUDY, VOLUME I, PARAGRAPH4; VOLUME II, PARAGRPAH 49

OTHER SIDE IN NEGOTIATIONS; NUCLEAR FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT;
EXERCISE BEHAVIOUR; AND ACTIONS INTIME OF TENSION OR CONFLICT.
SIMILARLY, WE SUGGEST THAT CONTINUING EFFORTS ARE NECESSARY TO
MAKE THE WP AWARE OF NATO'S CONCERNS OVER THE WP AGGRESSIVE STANCE.
EVEN IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES NATO MUST CONTINUE TO GIVE ATTENTION
TO THESE CONSIDERATIONS SO AS TO MAINTAIN THE CONTINUING OBJECTIVES
OF DETERRENCE, PARTICULARLY IF THE INTITAL FIGHTING IS AT A
RELATIVELY LOW INTENSITY.

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IMPLICATIONS FOR CONFLICT TERMINATION

9. THE WP STUDY OBSERVES THAT THE MOST SATISFACTORY WP RESPONSE (IN NATO'S EYES) TO NATO INTITIAL USE, AND ONE WHICH FITS WITH AN ASSUMPTION OF CAUTION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, WOULD BE A FULFILMENT OF NATO'S DETERRENT STRATEGY BY A SOOVIET DECISION TO HALT THE AGGRESSION(1). WE NOTE, IN THIS CONTEXT, THAT THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE STATED THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE THREAT OF FURTHER ESCALATION IS TO INDUCE THE ENEMY TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND TO WITHDRAW(2). NATO'S THREAT OF FURTHER ESCALATION IN THIS CASE WOULD HAVE TO BE SUCH THAT DETERRENCE DURING ANY CONFLICT WOULD NOT ONLY HAVE TO WORK AGAINST ANYINTENSIFICATION OR CONTINUATION OF ENEMY ACTION BUT WOULD HAVE TO OPERATE ALSO IN A WAY WHICH CONTRIBUTES,IN ADDITION TO OTHER POLITICAL AND MILITARY STEPS, TO THE FINAL ENEMY WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO TERRITORY.

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(1) WP STUDY, VOLUMEI, PARAGRAPH9; VOLUME II, PARAGRAPH 77
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(2) DPC/D(69)58(REVISED), 10TH DECEMBER, 1970, PARAGRAPH 21

CONCLUDING REMARKS

10. WE BELIEVE THE ANALYSIS IN THE WP STUDY AND THE COMMENTS IN THIS REPORT MAY BE OF INTEREST TO THE DPC AND OF POTENTIAL VALUE TO OTHER NATO BODIES AND AGENCIES IN THE CONDUCT OF THEIR PLANNING AND ACTIVITIES. THE WP STUDY HAS HIGHLIGHTED THE FACT THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THERE TO BE ANY DOGMATIC AND SPECIFICPREDICTIONS IN THIS FIELD, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THERE ARE LIMITATIONS TO OUR SOURCES OF INFORMATION, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE FACTORS AFFECTING WP POLICIES MAY CHANGE. A MEANINGFUL UNDERSTANDING OF WP POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SHOULD THEREFORE BE ENHANCED BY CONTINUING EFFORTS TO ASSEMBLE AND ANALYSE CURRENT AND AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION.

11. IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THEEVIDENCE AVAILABLE, THE WP

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STUDY'S MAIN CONCLUSION IS THAT NATO DECISIONS IN THE EVENT OF
HOSTILITIES WITH THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD NOT BE BASED SOLELY ON A
SINGLE ASSUMPTION OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WP MIGHT RESPOND. WE
ENDORSE THIS CONCLUSION AND SUGGEST THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE STUDY
MERITS CONTINUING ATTENTION IN VIEW OF ITS RELEVANCE TO NATO'S
PEACETIME DETERRENT POSTURE AND TO POSSIBLE NATO COURSESOF ACTION
IN TIME OF TENSION OR CONFLICT.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

12. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE DPC:

(A) NOTE THE WP STUDY ATTACHED HERETO AND THE RELATED COMMENTS
IN THIS REPORT;
(B) NOTE, IN PARTICULAR, OUR CONCLUSION THAT THE
WP STUDY DOES NOT CALL INTO QUESTION THE VALIDITY
OF CURRRENT NATO STRATEGY AND OTHER BASIC POLICY
GUIDANCE;
(C) AGREE THAT THE WP STUDY AND THE COMMENTS IN THIS
REPORT SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN NATO
PEACETIME PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING IN TIME
OF TENSION OR CONFLICT; AND
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(D) INVITE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND APPROPRIATE NATO
ACTIVITIES TO CONTRIBUTE ON A CONTINUING BASIS
TOWARD IMPROVING NATO UNDERSTANDING OF WP
POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE
FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

ANNEX: STUDY ON WARSAW PACT POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND
MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
7TH MARCH, 1974. DISTRIBUTED EARLIER IN THE NPG UNDER
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Disposition Authority: garlanwa
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Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
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Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags: ANOMALY
Review Date: 10 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <10 APR 2002 by elyme>; APPROVED <05-Sep-2002 by garlanwa>; APPROVED <05-Sep-2002 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NPG DRAFT PERM REP REPORTS
TAGS: PFOR, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN
USNMR SHAPE
SACLANT
CINCLANT
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005

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